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 INTRODUCTION 
 People who are politically “conservative” or “libertarian” in the 
way those terms are often deployed in contemporary American public 
discourse almost universally regard the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act (PPACA)1 as objectionable and, in a related but distinct 
vein, unconstitutional.  The favorite focus of such conservative and li-
bertarian protest is the Act’s so-called individual mandate—the re-
quirement that individuals buy health insurance from a private mar-
 
 † Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor of Law, and John F. Scarpa Chair, 
Villanova University School of Law.  I am grateful to the editors of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review for their invitation to participate in their Symposium, “The 
New American Health Care System:  Reform, Revolution, or Missed Opportunity,” for 
their warm hospitality on the occasion, and for their fine editing.  I am also grateful to 
Professors Ted Ruger and Mark Hall for their probing but encouraging questions dur-
ing and after the Symposium.  Ethan Townsend and Emily Rasmussen provided help-
ful research assistance. 
1 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).  
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ket.2  As of the time of writing, federal district courts in Florida and 
Virginia have held the Act unconstitutional on account of the individ-
ual mandate.3  In each case Republican presidents had appointed the 
district judge.4  The two district judges that have upheld the Act 
against constitutional challenge5 were appointed by Democratic presi-
dents.6  Regardless of whether one approaches the issue from the right, 
the left, or the middle, however, the individual mandate merits a hard 
look:  a statutory requirement that an individual spend his or her mon-
ey on health insurance unsettles many entrenched American moral, po-
litical, and legal expectations.  Whether this requirement does so for 
good or for ill remains to be seen. 
The conservative and libertarian objections to the individual 
mandate implicate some of the deepest and most contested questions 
concerning our Constitution, constitutionalism in general, and the re-
lation of positive law—including constitutional law—to the ends of 
good government.  It is no exaggeration to say that it even implicates 
questions about who we are.  Professor Randy Barnett has recently ar-
gued that the mandate raises questions about the sovereignty of “We 
the People.”7  Specifically, Barnett contends that the mandate is un-
constitutional because it violates the people’s sovereignty by “comman-
deering” them into buying health insurance.8  Why, one must therefore 
ask, is it wrong for a government to commandeer its own people? 
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) first defines commandeer as 
“to command or force into military service,” 9 which is not something 
the Act assays.  The OED further defines commandeer as “to take arbi-
trary possession of.”10  But who can possibly contend that the individu-
al mandate, whatever its perceived merits or demerits, is an “arbitrary” 
act by Congress?  It was instead deeply deliberate.  Perhaps Barnett’s 
 
2 PPACA § 1501, 42 U.S.C.A § 18091 (West. Supp. 1B 2010). 
3 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-0091, 2011 
WL 285683, at *33 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 
F. Supp. 2d 768, 782 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
4 See Kevin Sack, Federal Judge Rules That Health Law Violates Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 1, 2011, at A1. 
5 Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, No. 10-0015, 2010 WL 4860299, at *11 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 
2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 891-95 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
6 See Sack, supra note 4. 
7 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
8 Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People:  Why the Individual Health Insurance 
Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 586-87 (2011). 
9 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 542 (2d ed. 1989). 
10 Id. 
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objection is better phrased as the government commanding citizens to 
take this particular action?  Is it not, however, part of the essential 
function of government to command people on certain matters? 
In what follows, I will suggest that Barnett’s position depends 
upon a reading of our moral, political, and legal traditions of under-
standing that is both debatable and, in fact, mistaken.  I will suggest, 
moreover, that as we gradually make and remake American politico-
legal culture, as we necessarily do from one season to the next, we 
would do best to acknowledge and live within a creative tension re-
garding the work required of the civil ruling authority.  This paradigm 
requires, in turn, foregoing the cheap fictions of sovereignty that, alas, 
stud contemporary and historical Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Why a “creative tension?”  On the one hand, we cannot reasonably 
assume that the government that governs least is best; government can 
deliver some important human goods more efficiently, and there are 
still other goods that government alone can provide.  On the other 
hand, we cannot reasonably presume that government can solve all 
problems; there are some human goods that individuals or private 
groups can better or uniquely achieve.  The nature and extent of gov-
ernment action properly vary across time and circumstance, and thus, 
so do the very forms of government itself.  Always, however, determin-
ing what role government should play in particular times and places 
precludes absolutism—the absolutism of imagined popular, individual, 
or state “sovereignty.”  This determination also precludes the stealth ab-
solutism of some forms of “originalism” in constitutional interpretation. 
I.  SETTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINAL CONTEXT 
The individual mandate invites constitutional scrutiny on any 
number of grounds, but the focus here will be its constitutional status 
vis-à-vis the Commerce Clause in conjunction with the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  The focus, more specifically, will be its status under 
the Commerce Clause as currently construed.11  As such—with a poss-
ible exception to be noted below—the mandate must be sustainable, if 
at all, as a regulation of economic activity that works a “substantial ef-
fect” on interstate commerce.  Under United States v. Lopez,12 there are 
three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its 
commerce power.  First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels 
 
11 The mandate’s status under any number of possible “originalist” or other inter-
pretations will for now be put to the side. 
12 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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of interstate commerce.  Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and 
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or 
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only 
from intrastate activities.  Finally, Congress’ commerce authority in-
cludes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation 
to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect inter-
state commerce.
13
 
Plainly, if the individual mandate is sustainable under the Commerce 
Clause, it would be thanks to the third prong of the Lopez test—regulation 
of activity that has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce. 
Unlike the first two prongs of the Lopez test, the substantial effects 
test is not, according to Barnett, the product of an interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause.14  Rather, according to Barnett, the substantial 
effects test is correctly interpreted as an application of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause “in the context of the regulation of interstate 
commerce.”15  While others view the matter differently—believing that 
the Court has expanded the very meaning of “commerce” since the 
New Deal16—I will simply stipulate to Barnett’s position here.  The 
presence of the Necessary and Proper Clause as a link in the chain of 
argument provides Barnett with the textual predicate for his argu-
ment:  the individual mandate is unconstitutional because it violates 
our sovereignty. 
According to Barnett, a regulation of economic activity is constitu-
tionally permissible provided that it is both necessary and proper.17  If 
one were to treat “necessary” and “proper” either as a unit or as an in-
stance of pleonasm, what is necessary would also necessarily be prop-
er.  If each word is given its own meaning, however, what is necessary 
 
13 Id. at 558-59 (internal citations omitted). 
14 See Barnett, supra note 8, at 593 (“Therefore, all future cases applying this doc-
trine are not, strictly speaking, ‘Commerce Clause cases.’”). 
15 See id. (citing J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 619); see also Michael Paulsen & Randy Barnett, Debate 
on the Original Meaning of the Commerce, Spending, and Necessary and Proper Clauses, (Bar-
nett, Statement) (discussing the history and later expansion of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause) in ORIGINALISM:  A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 262-73 (Steven Cala-
bresi ed., 2007).  Because the Clause was added to the Constitution by the Committee of 
Detail, without any previous discussion in the Constitutional Convention, it has proved 
especially difficult for originalists to settle on its meaning.  Paulsen & Barnett, supra.  
16 See Barnett, supra note 8, at 587-89 (describing the “law professors’ understand-
ing” of the expanding Commerce Clause). 
17 See id. at 590-93 (explaining how the Supreme Court expanded the Commerce 
Clause doctrine to include the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
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must also be proper to withstand a challenge to its constitutionality.18  
Barnett makes a strong case for giving each word its own bite.19  In 
Barnett’s view, there are right ways (proper) and wrong ways (impro-
per) of regulating those activities that have a substantial effect on in-
terstate commerce (necessary).20  I will say more shortly about the de-
mands of “proper,” but first there is a further reason why this question 
that so rarely gets asked—What is “proper” regulation?—is apt. 
That further reason involves a legal argument that seems to be 
picking up steam, though it still lacks a majority vote in recent Su-
preme Court jurisprudence.  While conditionally conceding that the 
mandate must meet the “economic activity” test of Lopez and its prog-
eny, some proponents of the mandate have also recently defended it 
on an alternative ground.  Specifically, they contend that although not 
itself regulation of an economic act, the mandate is nonetheless consti-
tutional because it is part of a larger regulatory scheme that is neces-
sary and proper to the regulation of interstate commerce.21 
These proponents have on their side not only dicta and implica-
tures of Lopez itself, but also language from the majority opinion of 
the more recent case Gonzales v. Raich.22  Additionally, Justice Scalia 
explicitly developed this theory in his concurring opinion in the same 
case:  “As we implicitly acknowledged in Lopez . . . Congress’s authority 
to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate 
commerce is not limited to laws directed against economic activities 
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”23 
Although the Court has yet to adopt Justice Scalia’s theory that 
Congress’s power to regulate is not confined to economic activity, one 
can reasonably question how the individual mandate would fare un-
der Scalia’s theory.  If one concedes that the mandate itself is not a 
 
18 See id. at 621 (“The Necessary and Proper Clause requires that laws be ‘proper’ 
as well.”). 
19 See id. at 621-26 (arguing that both “Necessary” and “Proper” should be afforded 
proper weight by judges); see also Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope 
of Federal Power:  A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 271 
(1993) (“We submit that the word ‘proper’ serves a critical, although previously largely 
unacknowledged, constitutional purpose . . . .”). 
20 See Barnett, supra note 8, at 624 (describing decisions in which Justices have dis-
tinguished between proper and improper means of regulation). 
21 Cf. id. at 614-18 (acknowledging but rejecting the argument that the individual 
mandate is constitutional because it rests within a broader regulatory framework). 
22 545 U.S. 1 (2005).  The Court found the Controlled Substances Act to be consti-
tutional because it was part of a broad regulatory framework, unlike the statutes de-
clared unconstitutional in Lopez and United States v. Morrison.  Id. at 23-26.  
23 Id. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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regulation of economic activity but is nonetheless “necessary” because 
it is essential to a broader scheme of regulation of interstate com-
merce, then there remains a further question to be asked:  is it a 
“proper” means by which Congress may exercise its power over inter-
state commerce?  According to the enduring test set out by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland:  “Let the end be legitimate, let 
it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are ap-
propriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohi-
bited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are con-
stitutional.”24  As parsed by Barnett, this sentence establishes that a 
means is proper when it is, first, not prohibited and, second, otherwise 
consistent “with the letter and spirit of the constitution.”25 
Accepting for present purposes this understanding of the re-
quirements of what it means to be “proper,” is the individual mandate 
proper?  Assuming it is not forbidden, does it yet “consist with the let-
ter and spirit of the constitution?”26 
In order to establish that it does not so consist, Barnett next in-
vokes the recent line of “anti-commandeering” cases, which hold that 
Congress cannot “commandeer” the states in certain respects.27  For 
the definitional reason mentioned at the outset, this line of cases 
seems to operate under a misnomer:  military service is not involved, 
and there is no hint that the congressional commands at issue are ar-
bitrary.  Definitional concerns aside, it has long been established that 
the Supremacy Clause requires that state judges can be “comman-
deered” to follow federal law.28  The principle that Congress cannot 
commandeer state legislative or executive actions29 is of more recent 
vintage and of questionable strength.30  There is also the question of 
 
24 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
25 Barnett, supra note 8, at 621. 
26 Id. 
27 See id. at 626-27 (“As we have seen, the anti-commandeering cases that limit the 
commerce power of Congress were ultimately grounded by the Supreme Court in the 
text of the Tenth Amendment.”). 
28 See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392, 394 (1947) (holding that state courts cannot 
refuse to enforce federal law absent a “valid excuse”). 
29 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144 (1992).  
30 Saikrishna Prakash has defended the view that the Framers were hostile to na-
tional commandeering of state legislatures because they are “sovereign,” but open to 
national commandeering of state magistracy.  Saikrishna Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 
79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1961-62 (1993).  Evan Caminker maintains that the Framers ex-
pected Congress to be able to commandeer state legislatures as well as state executive and 
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whether the principle has more than an “attenuated” basis in the 
Tenth Amendment.31  Nevertheless, the relevant aspects of the anti-
commandeering cases are familiar. 
In the first such case, New York v. United States, the Court struck 
down Congress’s attempt to use its commerce power to mandate that 
any state that refused to enter into interstate compacts to dispose of 
nuclear waste must itself take title to the nuclear waste.32  In her opi-
nion for the Court, Justice O’Connor explained that “the Constitution 
has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to 
require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”33  
Justice O’Connor characterized Congress’s instructions to the states 
as unconstitutional “commandeering”:  “Congress may not simply 
‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly com-
pelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’”34  
In New York, the Court held that “‘the Act commandeers the legislative 
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and en-
force a federal regulatory program,’ an outcome that has never been 
understood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by 
the Constitution.”35 
Five years later, Congress used its commerce power to mandate 
that local sheriffs run background checks on gun buyers.  In Printz v. 
United States, the Supreme Court held that this, too, was an improper 
commandeering of state officials.36  Writing for the Court, Justice Sca-
lia recognized a principle of state sovereignty underlying several pro-
visions of the Constitution,37 but he relied primarily on the Tenth 
Amendment: 
 
judicial officials.  Evan Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy:  May Congress Comman-
deer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1042-50 (1995).   
31 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:  THE 
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 444 (2010) (describing the “rule against federal ‘com-
mandeering’ of state legislatures or executive officers” as “loosely associated with the 
Tenth Amendment”). 
32 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). 
33 Id. at 162. 
34 Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 
264, 288 (1981)). 
35 Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288). 
36 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
37 These provisions included:  
the prohibition on any involuntary reduction or combination of a State’s terri-
tory, Art. IV, § 3; the Judicial Power Clause, Art. III, § 2, and the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, which speak of the “Citizens” of the States; the 
amendment provision, Article V, which requires the votes of three-fourths of 
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Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the Constitu-
tion’s conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but only 
discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, § 8, which implication was rendered 
express by the Tenth Amendment’s assertion that “[t]he powers not de-
legated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”38 
In sum, wrote Justice Scalia, “The Federal Government may neither 
issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, 
nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivi-
sions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. . . . 
[S]uch commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitu-
tional system of dual sovereignty.”39 
Responding to the argument that this statutory directive was “ne-
cessary and proper” for Congress to effectuate its commerce power, 
Justice Scalia memorably described the Necessary and Proper Clause 
as “the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional 
action.”40  He went on to assert that when a law enacted pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty re-
flected in the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional provisions, 
“it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce 
Clause,’ and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, ‘merely [an] ac[t] 
of usurpation’ which ‘deserve[s] to be treated as such.’”41 
After marshalling additional evidence that the Court’s constitu-
tional prohibition on federal commandeering of states is rooted above 
all in the Tenth Amendment, Barnett makes his decisive next move, 
which is to note that the Tenth Amendment reserves undelegated 
powers not just to the states, but “to the states respectively, or to the 
people.”42  He continues: 
As Justice Thomas has written, the Tenth Amendment “avoids taking any 
position on the division of power between the state governments and the 
people of the States”—a position he reasserted just last term in his dissent-
ing opinion in Comstock in which Justice Scalia joined.  In this way, the text 
of the Tenth Amendment recognizes popular as well as state sovereignty.
43
 
 
the States to amend the Constitution; and the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4.   
Id. at 919. 
38 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X). 
39 Id. at 935. 
40 Id. at 923. 
41 Id. at 923-24 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(E.H. Scott ed., 1898)). 
42 Barnett, supra note 8, at 627 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added)). 
43 Id. (footnotes omitted).  
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Barnett’s syllogism is straightforward:  just as Congress cannot com-
mandeer states because they are sovereign, so too Congress cannot 
commandeer the people because they are sovereign.  Therefore, the indi-
vidual mandate, which surely “commandeers”—that is, commands—
individuals by making them spend their money on health insurance, is 
unconstitutional. 
Maybe, but maybe not.  What could it possibly mean to assert that 
the Tenth Amendment—or anything else?—makes people or states 
“sovereign?”  Saying it is so does not make it so.  The question of 
whether the predication at issue is true cannot be answered in an his-
torical or linguistic vacuum.  Smooth though Barnett’s syllogism is, 
there are reasons to question the validity of the premise that “We the 
People” are sovereign, and therefore not amenable to being com-
mandeered.  The argument from sovereignty proves too much, and 
thus proves nothing.  It is a problem of too many “sovereigns,” and 
therefore, of none at all. 
II.  MULTIPLYING SOVEREIGNS 
The linguistic antecedent of the English word “sovereignty” traces 
to fourteenth-century French, where in common—and sometimes le-
gal—parlance the word referred to any official endowed with superior 
force.44  It did not mean freedom from all superior ruling authority 
and a complete self-determination and independence of judgment.  
Over time, however, “[s]uch was the idea, and the purpose for which 
the word Sovereignty was coined.”45  In the modern period, a claim to 
“sovereignty” veers, like a car out of alignment, in the direction of be-
ing a claim to complete independence and freedom from all interfe-
rence with possible self-determination.  In the contending historical 
claims of contest to emerge from the medieval social hierarchy of 
Christendom, to claim sovereignty was to deny all dependence or sub-
ordination.  Those who today claim or assert sovereignty—whether 
they be nation-states, states, tribes, churches, or individuals—are es-
sentially saying, “You’re not the boss of me.”  Nations claiming sove-
reignty deny that other nations have the authority to rule them; states 
and tribal nations claiming sovereignty insist upon their own freedom 
of self-determination; and so forth. 
Some claims to self-determination are commendable, indeed ne-
cessary.  The brute assertion of power over another—whether that 
 
44 JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 38 n.31 (1951). 
45 Id. at 37-38. 
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other be a nation-state, a tribe, a church, a state, or an individual—is 
not legitimate.  Power must be justified if it is to be legitimate.  There 
are times when it is morally exigent to deny another’s claims to exer-
cise ruling power, and a claim to be “sovereign” is one historically at-
tested, if blunt, way to make just such a denial.  Still, no one except 
the anarchist denies that some exertions of power over another are 
indeed legitimate.  Somebody has to be the boss or else we would have 
no governance, no order, and none of the human goods that can only 
accrue thanks to order.  This point is not one of sophisticated political 
theory, logic, or even debate.  No group or its members can long exist, 
let alone prosper, without some measure of relatively stable agree-
ment about who is in charge, and of what.46  It is the work of politics 
and political philosophy (and perhaps theology) to draw the lines 
concerning who is properly the boss of whom, and concerning what. 
The Framers drafted and ratified the Constitution against a back-
ground of fierce debate about the location of sovereignty and, specifi-
cally, the transference of sovereignty from Parliament to the people.47  
The Articles of Confederation imputed sovereignty to each of the thir-
teen colonies.48  Even after the Constitution had been ratified, James 
Madison sought unsuccessfully to have recognition of the people’s so-
vereignty “prefixed to the constitution.”49  To our Constitution as 
 
46 As Yves Simon has argued, even a perfectly virtuous group of people would re-
quire what he refers to as the essential function of authority, namely, the coordination, 
for example, of which side of the road one is to drive on.  YVES R. SIMON, A GENERAL 
THEORY OF AUTHORITY 57-60 (2009).  Simon further argued that, 
Even in the smallest and most closely united community, unity of action can-
not be taken for granted; it has to be caused, and, if it is to be steady, it has to 
be assured a steady cause. . . .  Now unity of action depends upon unity of 
judgment, and unity of judgment can be procured either by way of unanimity 
or by way of authority; no third possibility is conceivable.   
YVES R. SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 19 (1951).  
47 See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 56 (1988) (contending, 
convincingly, that the concept of sovereignty was developed in England in opposition 
to the divine rights of kings).  On the role of imagination in making the people sove-
reign, see PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW:  MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CON-
STRUCTION OF AMERICA 189 (1997).  On the historical process by which the English 
Parliament became “sovereign,” see generally JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVE-
REIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT:  HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY (1999). 
48 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II (“Each state retains its sove-
reignty, freedom and independence . . . .”). 
49 Madison Resolution ( June 8, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  
THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 11 (Helen E. Veit et 
al. eds., 1991). 
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enacted, ratified, and handed down, however, the term “sovereignty” 
is wholly foreign:  the word simply does not appear in the document. 
Despite that deafening constitutional silence, our constitutional 
jurisprudence is thick with the concept of sovereignty.  Indeed, a brief 
inspection of the evidence reveals that the Supreme Court tries to 
solve some of the nation’s most important socio-legal questions by 
multiplying predications of sovereignty and applying them to just 
about all comers.  One can hardly blame Barnett for resorting to ar-
gument that sounds in sovereignty:  contemporary Supreme Court ju-
risprudence would make practically everybody except the family dog a 
sovereign.  Ironically, such jurisprudence ultimately makes the Court 
the closest thing to a true sovereign, because it is the Court that has 
final say over which “sovereign” will prevail in which contests.  But this 
gets ahead of things. 
Although the term “sovereign” does not appear in the Constitu-
tion, it entered our constitutional jurisprudence early, and with a ven-
geance, in the celebrated 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia.50  In its first 
big constitutional case, the Supreme Court declined to order the dis-
missal of Chisholm’s suit against Georgia in federal court for money 
damages.51  The Court disagreed with Georgia’s argument that it was a 
sovereign state clothed with the sovereign’s traditional immunity to 
suit without its consent.52 
The Chisholm Court’s jurisdictional decision was promptly over-
ruled by the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, of course, but the 
theory that the states were sovereign was just getting started.  Al-
though the Eleventh Amendment speaks only of the federal courts 
lack of jurisdiction over suits against states by citizens of other states,53 
since 1890 and the decision in Hans v. Louisiana, the Court has “un-
derstood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it 
says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms:  that the States 
entered into the federal system with their sovereignty intact.”54  After a 
 
50 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend XI. 
51 Id. at 479. 
52 See id. (“[A] state is suable by citizens of another state . . . .”). 
53 “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI. 
54 Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (citing Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).  For a chronicle of the American jurisprudential history 
of sovereignty, see Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty:  A Cautionary Note on 
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century of incremental growth and occasional recession, that presup-
position came to full flower in a trinity of cases decided over a span of 
seven years by the Rehnquist Court:  Seminole Tribe v. Florida,55 Alden v. 
Maine,56 and Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authori-
ty.57  In these cases the Court found that states were immune to uncon-
sented private suits for money damages in, respectively, federal court, 
state court, and federal administrative tribunals.  In each case the 
ground was the same, namely, the “presupposition” that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated boldly in Seminole:  “each State is a sovereign entity in 
our federal system.”58 
These declarations of the sovereignty of the states presuppose, how-
ever, the contending claim that the United States—the nation—is sove-
reign.  How can there be two sovereigns in the same place at the same 
time?  Does this not vitiate the very concept of sovereignty:  freedom 
from all higher ruling authority and complete independence?  This is ex-
actly the problem the Framers set out to solve, and they persuaded 
many, including Justice Anthony Kennedy,59 that they succeeded. 
In the late eighteenth century, political theorists derided the idea 
of an imperium in imperio (an empire within an empire), frequently 
terming it a “solecism.”60  In his well-known concurrence in U.S. Term 
Limits v. Thornton, Justice Kennedy undertook to dissolve the lingering 
appearance of solecism by the use of metaphor:  “[t]he Framers split 
the atom of sovereignty.”61  Five years later, in his opinion for the 
Court in Alden v. Maine, Justice Kennedy switched descriptive gears, 
explaining that the United States enjoys “primary sovereignty,”62 whe-
reas the states enjoy a “residuary and inviolable sovereignty.”63 
 
the Normative Power of the Actual, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 181, 195-204 (2006), which 
summarizes the “conventional” view of Eleventh Amendment sovereignty.   
55 See 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (granting sovereign immunity to Florida in a suit by 
an Indian tribe in federal court). 
56 See 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (explaining how states retain sovereignty in their 
own courts against their own citizens). 
57 See  535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002) (extending the Seminole Tribe reasoning to adminis-
trative tribunals). 
58 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54. 
59 See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
60 See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 14 
(2010). 
61 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
62 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999). 
63 Id. at 715 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 214 ( James Madison) (E.H. Scott 
ed., 1898)). 
BRENNAN REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/11/2011  7:31 PM 
2011] The Individual Mandate 1635 
Even this impressive multiplication of sovereigns hardly exhausts 
the roster.  Way back in Chisholm, the seriatim opinions of Chief Jus-
tice John Jay and Justice James Wilson rejected the sovereignty of the 
states on the very basis of the sovereignty of the people.  Chief Justice 
Jay wrote that “at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the 
people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country.”64  Justice 
Wilson, who had written and lectured on the concept of sovereignty 
(including in his famed Lectures on Law at the University of Pennsyl-
vania) in the period before Chisholm was decided,65 was ripe to the task 
in his opinion in the case: 
To the Constitution of the United States the term SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown.  
There is but one place where it could have been used with propriety.  But, even 
in that place it would not, perhaps, have comported with the delicacy of 
those, who ordained and established that Constitution.  They might have 
announced themselves “SOVEREIGN” people of the United States:  But se-
renely conscious of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration.
66
 
In his remarks in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the Constitu-
tion of the United States in 1787, Wilson opposed those who were ab-
solutists about the sovereignty of the states under the Articles of Con-
federation, arguing “that, in this country, the supreme, absolute, and 
uncontrollable power resides in the people at large.”67 
This is a thick concept of sovereignty indeed, and it is this that 
provides Barnett with the premise necessary to his syllogism:  “[I]n af-
firming the underlying principle of state sovereignty within the feder-
al system, the Supreme Court has never repudiated its early affirma-
tion of popular sovereignty in Chisholm. . . . [I]f imposing mandates on 
state legislatures and executives intrudes improperly into state sove-
reignty, might mandating the people improperly infringe on popular 
sovereignty?”68  Barnett’s answer is yes, in support of which he also 
quotes Yick Wo v. Hopkins, in which the Court explained that “in our 
 
64 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793). 
65 See James Wilson, Of the Constitutions of the United States and of Pennsylvania—Of 
the Legislative Department, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 829-32 (Kermit L. 
Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007); James Wilson, Of the General Principles of Law, in 1 
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra, at 494-99; James Wilson, Of Municipal Law, 
in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra, at 549-58, 567-70, 572-78; James Wil-
son, Of The Study of Law in the United States, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, 
supra, at 443-46. 
66 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 454.   
67 James Wilson, Remarks in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the Constitution of the 
United States, 1787, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 65, at 215. 
68 Barnett, supra note 8, at 629. 
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system, while sovereign powers are delegated to agencies of govern-
ment, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for 
whom all government exists and acts.”69 
National, state, and popular pretensions to sovereignty already 
dazzle the analytic mind.  Even this swelling collection of “sovereigns,” 
however, does not exhaust the contest for complete independence.  
Justice Wilson did not maintain only that the people en bloc are sove-
reign.  The people can be sovereign, according to Wilson, because each 
individual is an “original sovereign” who can aggregate himself with 
other original sovereigns to create “a collection of original sovereigns.”70 
Under modern Supreme Court jurisprudence, moreover, every 
individual approximates a sovereign in a sense more impressive than 
Wilson ever could have imagined.  That jurisprudence recognizes the 
individual’s right to live by his own norms, subject only—so far as ap-
pears—to the constitutional limit of the Millean harm principle, the 
idea, that is, that “the sole end for which mankind are warranted, in-
dividually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any 
of their number, is self-protection.”71  According to Mill and his fol-
lowers, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to pre-
vent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant.”72  While the Court did not mention either sove-
reignty or Mill by name in Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court struck 
down a Texas statute that criminalized “deviate sexual intercourse 
with another individual of the same sex,”73 the case has been widely 
celebrated as a recognition of the right of individuals to be “self-
norming,” limited only by the harm principle. 
 
69 Id. (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). 
70 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 456 (1793). 
71 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale 
Univ. Press 2003) (1859).    
72 Id.  “John Stuart Mill argued in effect that the harm principle is the only valid 
principle for determining legitimate invasions of liberty, so that no conduct that fails 
to satisfy its terms can properly be made criminal.”  1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIM-
ITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:  HARM TO OTHERS 11 (1984).  Occasionally and as an after-
thought, however, Mill seems to include the additional category of  “offense” within 
the scope of the criminal law.  See MILL, supra note 71, at 160 (“[T]here are many acts 
which, being directly injurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to be legally 
interdicted, but which, if done publicly . . . may rightfully be prohibited.”).  
73 539 U.S. 558, 563, 578-79 (2003) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) 
(West 2003)). 
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In fact, Barnett has been among the leading champions of such a 
reading of Lawrence.74  Another, more critical commentator summed 
up this reading of Lawrence as follows: 
In Lawrence . . . the Court in effect held, in agreement with and at the 
urging of the libertarian Cato Institute, that the Constitution does enact 
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.  The result, if consistently followed, would 
be to presume unconstitutional all laws limiting “liberty,” i.e., substantial-
ly all laws, and put on the states or national government the burden of 
justifying them.  As a corollary of this philosophic position and illustrating 
its potential, the Court explicitly rejected traditional standards of morali-
ty as a means of meeting the government’s burden of justification.
75
 
To fill in the unstated but operative intermediate premise in Lawrence, 
one need only quote the language of Mill’s On Liberty itself:  “Over 
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”76 
In sum, under current American constitutional jurisprudence, 
“sovereignty” is predicated either explicitly or implicitly of four very 
different entities:  the nation, each state, the people, and the individ-
ual.77  Given this diversity, one can safely concede that the concept 
signified by the word “sovereign” is not univocal.  In exactly what 
sense, then, is each of these very different entities “sovereign?”  What 
is it to be possessed of “sovereignty?” 
III.  MAKING SOME SENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY 
Predications of sovereignty abound and multiply in contemporary 
culture, but the concept of sovereignty is associated with no one more 
than it is with Thomas Hobbes, a man whose political theory terrified 
many of his contemporaries.78  By “sovereignty,” Hobbes meant the 
powers of nothing short of a “mortal god”: 
 
74 See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution:  Lawrence v. Texas, 
2002–2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 35-36 (2003) (arguing that Lawrence was “potentially 
revolutionary” because it required government “to justify its restriction on liberty” 
without declaring homosexual sex to be a fundamental right). 
75 Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas:  Our Philosopher-Kings Adopt Libertarianism as 
Our Official National Philosophy and Reject Traditional Morality as a Basis for Law, 65 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1139, 1140 (2004).   
76 MILL, supra note 71, at 81. 
77 While not entirely relevant here, there is actually a fifth category of “sovereign” 
under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the tribal nation.  See generally ROBERT 
ODAWI PORTER, SOVEREIGNTY, COLONIALISM AND THE INDIGENOUS NATIONS:  A READ-
ER 3-230 (2005). 
78 The reception of Leviathan was by no means uniform, however.  See G.A.J. Rog-
ers, Hobbes and His Contemporaries (noting that some of Hobbes’s positions “attracted a 
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[T]he multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in 
Latin CIVITAS.  This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather 
(to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God to which we owe, under the 
Immortal God, our peace and defence.  For by this authority, given him by 
every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much 
power and strength conferred on him that by terror thereof, he is 
enabled to conform the wills of them all to peace at home and mutual 
aid against their enemies abroad. . . . 
 And he that carrieth this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to 
have Sovereign Power ; and everyone besides, his SUBJECT.
79
 
As Philip Pettit has pointed out, 
Hobbes is conscious that this doctrine of more or less absolute sovereign 
authority may seem incredible when applied to individual monarchs . . . . 
He therefore tries to make a general case for the absolute extent of sove-
reignty by insisting that the rights that seem natural in the case of a 
wholly democratic sovereign—if indeed they do seem natural—must be 
ascribed on parallel grounds to a sovereign of any kind.
80
 
On Hobbes’s account, to be sovereign is to be bound by no law—
neither laws of one’s own making, nor even the divine natural law.  As 
Pettit underscores, “the sovereign may behave toward subjects in a way 
that breaches natural law.”81 
Hobbes’s is not the only canonical account of what it means to be 
sovereign.  When Jean Bodin clarified—and, in important respects, 
standardized—the nature of sovereignty three-quarters of a century 
earlier, the focal meaning was instructively different from the one 
Hobbes would later proffer.  Bodin examined the relationship be-
tween the lawgiver—what we would now call the state—and the law, 
and in particular whether the lawgiver was “sovereign” in the sense of 
not being bound by the law.  Bodin concluded that the lawgiver was 
indeed above—that is, not bound by—some human law.  At the same 
 
following” despite a “general hostility” toward his views), in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPA-
NION TO HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN 413 (Patricia Springborg ed., 2007).  
79 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 109 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1994) 
(1651).  
80 PHILIP PETTIT, MADE WITH WORDS:  HOBBES ON LANGUAGE, MIND, AND POLITICS 
127 (2008). 
81 Id; cf. NORBERTO BOBBIO, THOMAS HOBBES AND THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION 
165 (Daniela Gobetti trans., 1993) (noting “Hobbes’s particular thesis that it pertains 
to the sovereign to determine the content of natural laws”).  Machiavelli, though en-
gaged in a different project, comes close to Hobbes on the lawgiver’s complete inde-
pendence from antecedent law.  See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:  
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 160-61 
(1975) (noting that the legitimacy of Machiavelli’s innovating prince does not neces-
sarily depend upon law). 
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time, however, Bodin’s definition of sovereignty was not the same as 
the definition Hobbes would later adopt, which stated that the prince 
or government is not subject to higher law.82  Indeed, as Kenneth 
Pennington has demonstrated beyond cavil, for Bodin, the relation 
between the lawgiver and higher law is quite the opposite:  the human 
lawgiver, though “sovereign” in the sense of not being bound by all 
human laws, remains bound by higher law.83  Though commentators 
frequently miss the point, Bodin is unmistakably clear about the sove-
reign human lawmaker’s subordination to higher law: 
[T]hese doctors do not say what absolute power is.  For if we say that to 
have absolute power is not to be subject to any law at all, no prince of 
this world will be sovereign, since every earthly prince is subject to the 
laws of God and of nature and to various human laws that are common 
to all peoples.
84
 
Bodin continues, 
Hence, those who state it as a general rule that princes are not subject to 
their laws, or even to their contracts, give offense to God unless they 
make an exception for the laws of God and of nature and the just con-
tracts and treaties that princes have entered into . . . .
85
 
If sovereignty sometimes means the ruler’s complete independence 
from all law (unless, until, and for as long as the sovereign agrees to 
be bound by it), it assuredly did not mean that for Bodin or the tradi-
tion he continued.86  The more expansive meaning of governmental 
power came later, first with Hobbes and then with others.87 
 
82 In contrasting the two definitions of sovereignty, Perez Zagorin noted that,  
Bodin’s treatise, which exerted a wide influence, was included in the Hard-
wick Library and was familiar to Hobbes, who cited it in The Elements of Law to 
support his argument that the rights of sovereignty are indivisible. . . . Despite 
the amplitude of his conception of sovereignty, [Bodin] qualified its powers in 
several respects.  Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty, in contrast, was clarity itself 
and logically consistent as an analytic deduction from his understanding of 
the nature and function of government.  It differed from Bodin’s, moreover, 
in that his sovereign as supreme power and commander was not subject to any 
legal limits in the state that it ruled. 
PEREZ ZAGORIN, HOBBES AND THE LAW OF NATURE 68 (2009). 
83 KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW 1200–1600:  SOVEREIGNTY 
AND RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 276-83 (1993). 
84 JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY 10 ( Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1992) (1576). 
85 Id. at 31-32. 
86 Alison LaCroix seems to overlook this point when discussing Bodin in her oth-
erwise excellent book THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 
60, at 13 & 225 n.5.  One of the particular strengths of LaCroix’s account is its recogni-
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The sovereign governor’s claim to be above the law, moreover, has 
now been all but conferred on the “governed”—those who were pre-
viously governable.  These changes have not been unrelated.  “Liberty 
of the sovereign was as much outside the philosophy of the Middle 
Ages as was radical liberty of the individual.  The period during which 
emancipation of the individual made progress was the same as that in 
which emancipation of the sovereign was achieved.”88  Wilson was a 
man ahead of his time when, as we have seen, he propounded at the 
University of Pennsylvania the normative principle that every person is 
an “original sovereign,” such that unless and until she puts herself 
under law, she cannot be bound by law.  Today, under Lawrence, sove-
reignty has become a judicially enforceable claim for individuals to be 
something approaching self-norming.  Barnett has on his side both the 
thrust of much modern intellectual history and the Supreme Court of 
the United States when he contends that we begin from individual so-
vereignty and a “presumption of liberty,”89 meaning that the individual 
is presumptively ungoverned. 
As Barnett himself concedes, however, the presumption of indi-
vidual liberty is a conditional claim that one can rebut.  Even Barnett 
does not deny that government can and should refuse some attempts 
by individuals to assert their “liberty,” namely, those who would cause 
“harm.”  Individuals are not, therefore, meaningfully sovereign—
unless that term means only that individuals are subject to legal regu-
 
tion that the creators of American federalism drew on a long tradition of discussion of 
sovereignty and related concepts.  Id. at 12-16.  Patrick Thomas Riley also provides an 
outstanding account.  See generally Patrick Thomas Riley, Historical Development of the 
Theory of Federalism, 16th–19th Centuries (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Harvard University) (on file with Pusey Library, Harvard University). 
87 The struggle to locate “sovereignty” was considerable.  See OTTO GIERKE, NATU-
RAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY:  1500 TO 1800, at 40-44 (Ernest Barker trans., 
Beacon Press 1957) (1913) (discussing the debate over whether the people or the ruler 
was possessed of sovereignty).  Catholic social thought in the mid-twentieth century 
struggled with whether to reject the concept of “sovereignty,” as Maritain had insisted 
it should, or instead to attempt to cabin it, as Johannes Messner and Heinrich Rom-
men did.  See generally JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS:  NATURAL LAW IN THE 
WESTERN WORLD 574-629 ( J.J. Doherty trans., 1965); HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE 
STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT 397-410 (1945).  Harold Laski preceded Maritain in out-
right rejecting the “sovereignty” of the state.  See HAROLD J. LASKI, STUDIES IN THE PROB-
LEM OF SOVEREIGNTY 1-25 (1917). 
88 BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, SOVEREIGNTY:  AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICAL GOOD 
192 ( J.F. Huntington trans., 1957). 
89 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION 
OF LIBERTY 253-69 (2004) (advocating for protection of enumerated and unenumerated 
rights). 
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lation only when they are in fact subject to legal regulation.90  Nor are 
the people writ large meaningfully sovereign:  they are subject to valid 
laws of general applicability.  Are the states meaningfully sovereign?  
They are subject to valid regulation by the national government.  Is 
the nation sovereign?  It is subject to the norms of international law.  
It is also, at least arguably, subject to the norms of higher law—the 
contention and condition Hobbes set out to deny. 
IV.  TRANSFORMING THE POLITICO-LEGAL CULTURE AWAY FROM 
COMPETING “SOVEREIGNS” 
This last point, about the bearing of higher law on government, 
expands the context in which to evaluate the individual mandate.  
Barnett wants us—indeed, wants the Supreme Court—to begin from a 
presumption of liberty and, what he takes to be its correlate, a pre-
sumption against regulation.  Leaving aside for the moment the un-
stated justifications for those presumptions, however, we should note 
that a presumption in favor of liberty does not itself entail an absence 
of regulation.  For example, some individuals may not be “free” to be 
healthy unless they obtain medical care.  These same individuals may 
not be able to obtain medical care unless they have health insurance.  
And they may on occasion not have health insurance unless regula-
tions compel them to buy it.  The category of “liberty” is not ex-
hausted by negative liberty, or freedom from interference; it also in-
cludes positive liberty, or freedom to act or be in a certain way.91  The 
freedom to be healthy may be enhanced by regulation, and this ap-
parently is what Congress thought when it passed PPACA. 
 
90 The libertarian left rarely faces the governmental arbitrariness that is entailed 
by giving legal effect to revisable selves.  Discussing the Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey dictum that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence,” 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), Russell Hittinger argues that 
[t]here may well be a kernel of moral truth in the Casey dictum, but as it 
stands the “right” is under-specified.  Until it is further specified, no one can 
know who is bound to do (or not do) what to whom.  And so long as that con-
dition persists, there is no limit to the government.  On the one hand, we have 
a principle of unbounded individual liberty; on the other, a government re-
sponsible for enforcing that principle in a very arbitrary manner.   
RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE:  REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN A POST-
CHRISTIAN WORLD 130 (2003) (footnotes omitted).      
91 See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY 30-54, 216-17 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002) (defend-
ing negative liberty against government claims on behalf of positive liberty).  On what 
this distinction between negative and positive liberty means for Hobbes in particular, 
see generally QUENTIN SKINNER, HOBBES AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY (2008). 
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Even if that is indeed what Congress was thinking, as the legisla-
tive history suggests, Congress’s regulatory activity on behalf of health 
immediately collides with our general views on the role of govern-
ment, or at least our government, and, correlatively, ourselves.  As Wil-
liam Eskridge and John Ferejohn have recently registered in A Repub-
lic of Statutes:  The New American Constitution, the dominant model of 
constitutionalism in America today is one in which judges construe 
the Constitution to protect only negative rights.  “The biggest short-
coming of America’s judge-centric Constitution,” Eskridge and Fere-
john write, “is its seeming emphasis on negative rights or, in common 
parlance, its libertarianism.”92  While not denying that there has been 
a long Anglo-American tradition of limiting government’s role in pro-
tecting negative liberty, predating even the framing and ratification of 
our Constitution, Eskridge and Ferejohn observe that “[t]he Supreme 
Court has focused Constitutionalism upon negative rights and go-
vernmental limits—much more than is justified even by the classic 
‘liberal’ political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes.”93 
This is an intriguing claim, and its meaning turns in part on what 
is involved in “justifying” what we do with, or under, our Constitution.  
Without questioning the existence of the libertarian strand of our so-
cio-political culture and what it might mean for constitutional inter-
pretation, Eskridge and Ferejohn call attention to the other strands of 
that culture and what they in turn should mean for such interpreta-
tion.  In particular, they contend that “superstatutes” form part of our 
nation’s “fundamental law,” alongside the Constitution itself.94  PPACA 
was passed after A Republic of Statutes went to press, but Eskridge and 
Ferejohn do include the Medicare Act of 1965 as an example of a sta-
tutory commitment to a positive benefit that has become entrenched 
as part of America’s fundamental law.95 
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s elegant and controversial argument—
that statutes and the administrative schemes they launch should be 
treated on par with the Constitution—defies summary here.  What it 
establishes, though, at a minimum, is that there is a mainstream ar-
gument that highlights the ways in which our legal regime already—
and largely without controversy—treats the people not as presump-
tively “sovereign,” but instead as properly the subject of some regula-
 
92 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 31, at 43. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 8, 42. 
95 See id. at 196-98 (providing a brief history of the enactment of the Medicare Act 
of 1965). 
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tion that confers positive liberties.96  Even if such regulation is argua-
bly inconsistent with the original meaning of the Constitution, Es-
kridge and Ferejohn argue, we should now treat it as functionally 
amending the Constitution, in part because the procedures for formal 
amendment are too cumbersome to be carried out except in excep-
tional circumstances.97 
No one could plausibly think that the Constitution as originally 
understood included a right to adequate medical care, but when 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt announced a Second Bill of Rights in his 
State of the Union Address, on January 11, 1944, he asserted just such 
a right.  Eskridge and Ferejohn note that “FDR did not believe these 
rights,” including the right to adequate medical care, “were already in 
the Constitution, nor did he seek an Article V amendment.”98  Rather, 
they continue, 
[h]is project was to recognize these affirmative rights as fundamental 
commitments that a democratic government should be making to its cit-
izens; FDR’s deeper project was to perfect the Lockean state and recast 
government legitimacy as resting on its capacity to create structures al-
lowing every American to create a flourishing life—the concrete starting 
point for the consumerist constitution that has governed our country for 
the past two generations.  The primary mechanism for Roosevelt’s grand 
project was superstatutes.
99
 
The names of many of those statutes passed in the 1930s, such as the 
Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1935 and the Social Security Act of 
1935, are familiar to students of American history and law.  As men-
tioned above, Congress passed the Medicare Act thirty years after the 
passage of the Social Security Act.100  And, needless to say, it took until 
just last year for Congress to enact legislation aimed at a comprehen-
 
96 Id. at 43-48. 
97 See id. at 48-51 (characterizing the Constitution as “old, short, and hard to amend” 
and noting that “its intractable process for updating . . . has generated an amendment 
rate for the U.S. Constitution that is much lower than for any state constitution”). 
98 Id. at 46. 
99 Id. 
100 Discussing Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Great Society,” Morton Keller has noted that it 
was as representative of late-twentieth-century America and the populist-
bureaucratic regime as the New Deal was of Depression America.  It was fed 
not by depression or war but by a growing demand for rights by spokesmen of 
previously deprived groups and by a heightened concern for the quality of life 
in a mature industrial society:  products of the affluent, booming post-war years.  
MORTON KELLER, AMERICA’S THREE REGIMES:  A NEW POLITICAL HISTORY 225 (2007).  
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sive guarantee of the seventh right enumerated by FDR:  the right “to 
adequate medical care” and “good health.”101 
Barnett contends that a fatal defect in the individual mandate is 
that there is no “pre-existing duty” on the part of individuals to act, 
even for their own health.102  There was indeed no legal duty prior to 
the passage of the mandate, but are duty and obligation exhausted by 
positive law?  Yes, if we begin with Barnett’s splendidly simple pre-
sumption of liberty and assign a purely or largely negative role for the 
state.  But we need not begin with that presumption, as Eskridge and 
Ferejohn have demonstrated.  As times change, the positive obliga-
tions of government and the correlative positive rights of the go-
verned can change too.  Civic republicans, such as Eskridge and Fere-
john, affirm this proposition.103  Moreover, those who approach the 
question of the role of government from a moral perfectionist point of 
view in ethics should also affirm this proposition and affirm that it is the 
role of government to provide for those who do not provide for them-
selves.  This may be paternalistic, but that is no argument against it. 
Still, someone may object, ours is a written constitution meant to 
endure the ages without alteration except through the mechanisms of 
amendment provided in Article V:  our Constitution enumerates and 
thus limits the realm of legally enforceable rights.  As mentioned, Es-
kridge and Ferejohn have specifically denied this normative argument 
about Article V’s position as the exclusive mechanism for amendment.  
They argue instead that we should read “superstatutes,” such as PPA-
CA, as de facto constitutional amendments, sources of new rights and 
duties of the highest positive-law order.104  Whether or not one agrees 
 
101 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 31, at 46. 
102 Barnett, supra note 8, at 634. 
103 See also Vivienne Brown, Self-Government:  The Master Trope of Republican Liberty, 
84 MONIST 60, 71-72 (2001) (arguing that “republican liberty is distinct both from the 
notion of liberty as ‘freedom from’ actual or potential interference, and from the no-
tion of liberty as ‘freedom to’”). 
104 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 31, at 6-9, 18.  For a forceful argument 
that the only way to amend the Constitution is through Article V, see John R. Vile, Le-
gally Amending the United States Constitution:  The Exclusivity of Article V’s Mechanisms, 21 
CUMB. L. REV. 271, 271-72 (1991), which describes the two methods for amending the 
Constitution, both of which require Article V.  See also Henry Paul Monaghan, We the 
People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 
148 (1996) (“Examining the available writings to the extent that I . . . could, I can find 
no evidence—none at all—for the proposition that Article V was understood not to be 
the exclusive method of amendment because of an overriding and widely shared con-
ception of national popular sovereignty.”).  For a defense of “common law” techniques 
of enforcing new constitutional positive rights, see generally Helen Hershkoff, “Just 
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with that sentiment, the prospect of giving a nonoriginalist meaning 
to the Constitution reflects a cautionary point I raised at the outset.  
There are deep reasons to be wary of originalism in the absolutist way 
it is often understood. 
V.  QUESTIONS MORE FUNDAMENTAL THAN ASSERTIONS OF 
“SOVEREIGNTY” 
One of the remarkable facts about constitutional originalists is 
that they are only sometimes originalists about the objects of their polit-
ical affection.  The focus here, sovereignty, is perhaps the most glaring 
example of originalists’ selectivity.  Even though originalists some-
times disagree about the definition of originalism, they do all agree 
that it includes a close attention to the words of the Constitution.  As 
we have seen, however, “sovereignty” does not make even a passing 
appearance in the Constitution, let alone as a property of the nation, 
the states, the people, individuals, or tribes.  The originalist arguments 
in favor of sovereignty can only be defended on originalist grounds, so 
without words from which to argue, originalists must turn to original 
purposes of the Constitution. 
But if it is legitimate to consider the purposes behind the Consti-
tution where there are no enacted words to guide us in discerning 
those purposes, then a fortiori we should consider the Constitution’s 
purposes as well where there are words to guide us.  Some might coun-
ter by appealing to the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 
which in this context would mean that words preempt purposes.  This 
should be so, however, only if those who framed and ratified the Con-
stitution wished their words to be treated as exhausting their purpos-
es.  But why would we, in turn, agree to be bound by a document that 
we cannot integrate into purposive human living?  Many originalists, 
Justice Antonin Scalia among them, will answer this last question by 
arguing that the very point of any written constitution, including our 
own, is to establish an unchanging legal bedrock.105 
 
Words”:  Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 1521 (2010).  
105 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System:  The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws (“There is plenty of room for 
disagreement as to what original meaning was, and even more as to how that original 
meaning applies to the situation before the court.  But the originalist at least knows 
what he is looking for:  the original meaning of the text.”), in A MATTER OF INTERPRE-
TATION 3, 45 (Amy Guttman ed., 1998). 
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The question, though, is whether we can properly do just that.  Can 
we humans properly write a text and agree to bind ourselves to it, 
come what may?  In other words, is it morally permissible for us to be 
absolutists about a written constitution?106  If, as Justice Wilson con-
tended, we are “original sovereigns,” then the answer is presumably 
yes:  it is the privilege of an original sovereign to do what he or she 
will, including in concert with other original sovereigns.  If, however, 
we start from the judgment that we have an indefeasible moral obliga-
tion to set up good government in order to meet our human needs 
and worthy aspirations, then the question of the tenability of an “un-
changeable” constitution alters.  Humans operating under a moral ob-
ligation to set up worthy government can bind themselves to a text on-
ly to the extent that doing so is a prudent way of achieving the ends of 
good governance.  What is prudent will vary from time to time and 
place to place.  This variability is the locus of the creative tension to 
which I referred at the beginning.107 
We come, then, to a fundamental decision about who we think we 
are, and it is on the basis of this decision that some of our most basic 
 
106 Of course, the Constitution avoids absolutism of a sort by providing for its own 
amendment, but Eskridge and Ferejohn make a strong case that those mechanisms are 
so cumbersome as to render the Constitution functionally close to unamendable.  ES-
KRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 31, at 49-50.  More important, however, is that having a 
written constitution does not entail that all that is “constitutional” in a particular na-
tion can be found within that constitution and the case law construing it.  The current 
transformation of the British Constitution demonstrates aspects of the creative tension 
I have in mind.  “The truth is that constitutions . . . are never—repeat, never—written 
down in their entirety, so the fact that Britain lacks a capital-C Constitution is far less 
important than is often made out.”  ANTHONY KING, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 5 
(2007).  What is part of the constitution, therefore, will be the legitimate subject of 
ongoing debate.  Even Parliament’s pretensions to sovereignty are subject to rejec-
tion—a development with lessons worthy of export.  See Stephen Sedley, On the Move, 
LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 8, 2009, at 3, 3-5 (chronicling the emergence of a new 
rule of recognition in British constitutionalism).     
107 It is beyond my current purpose to provide much more detail about what I 
mean by a creative tension.  It is sufficient to note that individuals under an indefeasi-
ble obligation to create and enforce good governance cannot use texts to absolve 
themselves of that obligation.  I should underscore, however, that in morally hetero-
geneous cultures such as our own, prudence may well counsel in favor of stricter judi-
cial discipline which, in turn, flirts with the absolutism that is anathema.  The history of 
constitutionalism is the story of how to limit government power while also keeping it in 
service of the people, their goods, and their rights.  See, e.g, CHARLES HOWARD MCIL-
WAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM:  ANCIENT AND MODERN (1947) (providing a history of the 
development of constitutionalism).  For an especially insightful account of how a range 
of constitutional orders, including our own, are maintained and updated through in-
terpretation, see WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY:  CREATING AND 
MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 460-96 (2007). 
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choices about the law’s scope must be made.  Are we “original sove-
reigns?”108  Or are we, instead, under a moral obligation to set up wor-
thy structures of government in order to achieve the good life for 
humans?  The latter is the perspective of the natural law tradition, 
which has been neither completely dominant in nor completely ab-
sent from American political discourse.109  And those who affirm this 
principle as true—those who believe that we are under a higher law 
obligation to seek the good life, including through good government 
and good laws—will view themselves as morally obligated, in an inde-
feasible way, to struggle against those who would be absolutists about 
texts, or would assert a “presumption of liberty” and leave it at that.  
Texts, including constitutional texts, should serve worthy human pur-
poses, and those purposes may sometimes require government aid ra-
ther than a laissez-faire libertarianism.  Interestingly, the somewhat 
more expansive view of government’s role, to which the traditional 
understanding of the natural law leads, tends to align its adherents 
more with the contemporary American left than with the contempo-
rary American right, at least on some important matters (though cer-
tainly not on others). 
I will not attempt to answer here whether the individual mandate 
is in fact a prudent legislative response to a perceived human prob-
lem.110  My aim has been to show why the argument that the mandate 
violates individual sovereignty assumes answers to metaphysical ques-
 
108 In her Gifford Lectures, Jean Elshtain argues for the “less-than-sovereign self” 
on the basis of (among other grounds) our gendered dependency, our vulnerability, 
and our interrelatedness.  JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, SOVEREIGNTY:  GOD, STATE, AND 
SELF 159-80, 227-45 (2008).  Among the book’s many virtues, it establishes how ques-
tions about sovereignty always involve, at least implicitly, tradeoffs among claims about 
God, the state, and the human person.  Human vulnerability and dependence need to 
be at the center—not the margin—of political theory.  See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DE-
PENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS:  WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES 1-11 (1999).  
109 For a compendious account, see Robert P. Kraynak, Catholicism and the Declara-
tion of Independence:  An American Dilemma about Natural Rights, in MARITAIN AND AMERI-
CA 1-30 (Christopher Cullen & Joseph Allan Clair eds., 2009).  The classic account, 
which is in need of an update, is CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL 
LAW CONCEPTS:  A STUDY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OF THE INTERPRETATION OF LIM-
ITS ON LEGISLATURES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CERTAIN 
PHASES OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1930).  John Hart Ely acknowledges 
some of the historical role of natural law argument in American constitutionalism but 
concludes prematurely that it is “discredited” and “no longer respectable.”  JOHN HART 
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 48-52 (1980). 
110 A forceful criticism of an insurance-based means of meeting the moral obliga-
tion to ensure adequate health care to all is presented in JOHN C. MÉDAILLE, TOWARD 
A TRULY FREE MARKET:  A DISTRIBUTIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT, 
TAXES, HEALTH CARE, DEFICITS, AND MORE 207-22 (2010). 
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tions that Barnett does not provide.111  Barnett and his supporters 
must argue for the claim that we are original sovereigns, not merely 
assert it.  The natural law claim that we are not sovereign but are in-
stead obligated to seek the good life, including through the creation of 
government that is at the service of the people, also requires argu-
ment.112  This much is beyond dispute, however:  “[W]hen we return 
to a conception of sovereignty that recognizes norms outside the 
state’s positive law, we shall be returning to a system of thought that 
has deep roots in Western law.”113  In this, I submit, we should take 
some real satisfaction, though Barnett would probably disagree.  
Meanwhile, “[t]he only obstacles in the way of [sovereignty’s] indefi-
nite growth are three orders of laws, all of which came to be abrogated 
by three historical facts:  irreligion, legal positivism and sovereignty of 
the people.”114  
 
 
 
111 At times, Barnett justifies his “presumption of liberty” as no more than a con-
struction—as opposed to an interpretation, following Keith Whittington’s distinction—
of the Constitution.  See Paulsen & Barnett, supra note 15, at 275-76 (Barnett, Discus-
sion) (stating that he does “not claim that the presumption of liberty is an interpreta-
tion of the Constitution” and is instead only a “construction”).  When Barnett offers a 
modestly more ambitious argument in favor of natural rights that protect liberty, he 
does so with the condition that we “want a society in which people can pursue happi-
ness.”  BARNETT, supra note 89, at 82.  The natural law tradition, by contrast, does not 
rest natural rights on the mercurial contingency of what individuals “want.”  On a re-
lated point, Barnett states that “[n]atural law ethics or ‘natural right’ is a method of 
assessing the propriety of individual conduct.”  Id.  Classical proponents of natural law 
and natural right, however, would hardly find their position recognizable in this ques-
tion-begging caricature.  For them, the natural law and natural right govern everything 
for the common good, which includes but is not exhausted by individual goods.  On the 
priority of the common good in the natural law tradition, see Charles De Koninck, The 
Primary of the Common Good Against the Personalists, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF CHARLES DE 
KONINCK 63-164 (Ralph McInerny ed., 2009).  
112 This will be the burden of my forthcoming book, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE 
GOOD:  AN ESSAY ON LAW, AUTHORITY, AND THE CHURCH (forthcoming 2013).  I have 
argued for this proposition before.  See, e.g., Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Place of 
“Higher Law” in the Quotidian Practice of Law:  Herein of Practical Reason, Natural Law, 
Natural Rights, and Sex Toys, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL. 437, 442 (2009) (“Natural law and 
the natural rights that derive from it . . . are all about what is concretely good for hu-
mans and their communities . . . .”).   
113 PENNINGTON, supra note 83, at 290. 
114
DE JOUVENEL, supra note 88, at 185. 
